3 positivist lists human rights treaties protecting labour rights, or other documents explicitly recognising labour rights as human rights as a starting point, and is satisfied that the answer is positive, if it is sufficiently supported in law. 2 Looking at the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is a non-binding but enormously influential document, the positivist finds that several labour rights are human rights:
article 4 of the UDHR prohibits slavery and servitude; article 23 provides that everyone has the right to work and that everyone should work in a job freely chosen; that everyone should receive equal pay for equal work; that everyone should get decent remuneration for work performed, which should guarantee a dignified life for herself and her family;
and that everyone has a right to form and join trade unions; article 24, in turn, guarantees a right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitations of working hours, as well as holidays with pay. Listing these provisions, a positivist is satisfied that not only are labour rights human rights, but that there is an extensive list of these rights in human rights law.
The positivist would describe the legal protection that the international community affords labour rights, and would find that it decided to divide human rights in categories, recognising them varying degrees of protection. Treaties that followed the UDHR separated certain labour rights from some others, classifying a group of them as civil and Against this background, rights such as the right to form and join a trade union and the right to privacy were categorised as civil and political rights, and rights such as the right to work, the right to decent working conditions or the right to strike, were categorised as social and economic rights. The implication of this was that some of these were viewed as real human rights, while others were presented as aspirational goals. 4 To find an answer to the question whether labour rights are human rights, a positivist might also turn to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the expert branch of the UN in the field of labour rights. 5 The ILO predates all the human rights treaties and organisations (having been founded in 1919), which shows that labour issues became a matter of international concern before human rights. Does the ILO view labour rights as human rights? For many decades, the ILO did not explicitly present the documents 3 The ICESCR now has an optional Protocol on individual petition, which is not yet operational. 4 See the discussion in D Barak-Erez and AM Gross, 'Introduction: Do We Need Social Rights?', in Barak- The positivist does not have the tools to address problems such as this, and may have difficulties when it comes to interpretation of rights more generally.
b. The instrumental approach
The positivistic path is not the one that is most taken in labour law literature, even though positive law is the starting point for those taking the most common approach in labour law scholarship, the instrumental approach. On the argument that human rights are individualistic, a characteristic which creates a sharp line that distinguishes them from labour rights, it should be said that certain labour rights, such as the right to strike, can only be exercised through collective action. Yet other labour rights are individual rights, which are mainly exercised individually (though they can also be promoted through collective action). The prohibition of slavery and forced labour, the right to work or the right to privacy, exemplify this point. Moreover, there are traditional civil and political rights, which can only be exercised collectively: the right to freedom of assembly and association, for example, can only be exercised by groups. There is nothing, in other words, in the nature of human rights that should make as view them as necessarily atomistic, as Robin West has argued: 'Rights could as readily be grounded in a view of our nature that both respects our individuality and also gives full recognition to our social nature: our extended periods of biological dependence on caregivers, the resulting dependence of those caregivers on the support of others, our obligations to our communities and neighborhoods, our civic and charitable duties to others, and our responsibilities to engage in civic life'. 53 To this list we could add: our lives spent at work. 54 If the claim that human rights are individualistic refers to the fact rights discourse' is rejected altogether. 55 The costs of abandoning rights as a discourse, however, are not always carefully considered. These include a loss in aspirational standards and impoverishment in normative legal scholarship.
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It is also important to be mindful of possible shortcomings in the instrumental use of human rights in order to advance strategic goals: first, if a strategy fails, it may create a precedent that a particular labour right is not a human right, which may be hard to reverse. This becomes evident when thinking about the case law of the 1970s and 1980s on collective labour rights under the ECHR. Second, (admittedly a remote concern at this stage) if a strategy is successful, it may lead to an inflation of rights and build stringency in claims that may not carry this stringency. A very expansive interpretation of existing provisions may reduce the moral weight of human rights claims, and may in this way be counterproductive in the long run.
In any case, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the law and the judiciary may sometimes not be protective of labour rights as human rights should not be seen as a reason to reject the character of certain labour rights as human rights. What it means is that both the law and the attitude of the judiciary should change if labour rights are human rights at a normative level, which is the question that the section that follows addresses.
c. The normative approach
The third approach to the question whether labour rights are human rights, views it as a theoretical (rather than positivistic and instrumental) and normative (rather than descriptive) issue. It does not necessarily engage with positive law or activists' strategies, (though it has implications for the law, its development and its interpretation), but examines the issue as a matter of moral truth. This line of thinking is the one least taken in labour law scholarship and in human rights theory, but literature on it has started to appear in recent years. 57 The emerging scholarship questions the nature of labour rights as human rights. This view was usefully summarised in a recent piece by Hugh Collins, which can serve as a starting point for the present discussion. Collins examined possible justifications for labour law in human rights theory, 58 and defined human rights as rights that are accorded to all human beings by virtue of their humanity. These are 'universal and imperative, with a special moral weight that normally overrides other considerations'. 59 Collins accepted that labour rights do not have some key characteristics of human rights that we find in this definition, and should therefore not be categorised as such. 60 Four arguments were said to support this position.
The first argument against labour rights as human rights is that they do not represent the same urgent and compelling moral claims (the 'non-compellingness thesis'). The second argument is that labour rights are not universally applicable as other human rights (the 'non-universality thesis'). According to the third argument, labour rights do not embody standards that are strict enough (the 'non-strictness thesis'). The final argument is that labour rights evolve over time, while universal human rights embody timeless, fundamental needs ('the non-timelessness thesis'). On this view, because labour rights are not human rights, we should not be seeking a justification for labour law in human rights theory, meaning most probably the natural law tradition. This does not mean that we cannot turn to other justifications in liberal political theory where there may be potential to give a certain degree of priority to labour law issues in developing a theory of justice.
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Is it correct to say that labour rights are not human rights? 
Labour rights as compelling claims
One of the key characteristics of human rights is that they are claims that prohibit grave moral wrongs. 62 In this sense, at least certain labour rights are compelling and qualify as claims that prohibit such moral wrongs. A number of examples can be used to show this.
A human right that is compelling and absolute is the prohibition of torture. The right not to be tortured and ill-treated, frequently presented as a paradigm of a universal human right, is an extremely compelling moral claim. There is something deeply demeaning in suffering emotional humiliation and physical pain, and a right to be protected from this conduct can readily be recognised as an essential in a catalogue of human rights.
There is similarly something deeply degrading and humiliating in being ill-treated by an employer, and examples of serious abuse in the workplace exist the world over. Similarly, protection of workers' privacy against employer interference is an equally compelling claim. Dismissal because of private activities -intimate relationships, for instance -leads to a loss of dignity and a stigma that does not differ much from the loss suffered when the state monitors the intimate relations of citizens and punishes them for such relations. It is a mistake to think that the right to privacy against state interference is more fundamental than the right to privacy against employer interference.
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At the same time, it may be said that the right to deny the Holocaust, which has been recognised as an aspect of freedom of expression, is not a claim of great moral urgencyand in fact is of less importance if compared to a right to paid holidays that is used as an example of a non-urgent labour right. 66 On this point, it should be noted that the fact that the right to paid holidays is included in the UDHR does not necessarily mean that it is a human right in the sense discussed in this section. Equally, it is important to add that the importance of a right to paid holidays should not be underestimated. For people living in poverty and working very long hours with very low pay, having no holidays with pay might mean having no time-off work at all, since they would not be able to afford it.
Leisure is essential for a worker, though, and being unable to rest is exhausting. As Jack Donnelly underlines in response to Cranston, 'the full right recognized is a right to "rest, leisure, and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay".
Denial of this right would indeed be a serious affront to human dignity; it was, for example, one of the most oppressive features of unregulated nineteenth century capitalism'. 67 It would also be a serious denial of freedom. Work is a key means to earn one's living, and resources are inextricably linked to freedom. 68 Holidays without pay could lead to unfreedom for the neediest.
Labour Rights as Universal Claims
The second argument, namely that labour rights are not universal because they apply only to workers and not to everyone, is again prone to criticism. That a right is 65 For analysis, see V Mantouvalou, 'Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public Spaces', conditional upon a particular status does not mean that it is not a human right. The corresponding duties may be conditional upon a certain status, as Tasioulas has argued.
69
The example of migrants' rights can illustrate this point. It is a well-established principle in human rights and refugee law, for instance, that states should not extradite foreign nationals to countries where they may be subjected to torture. 70 The fact that the rightholder is a migrant in this example, namely someone who resides outside her home country, and not each and every person at any time, does not make it any less of a universal human right. What it means is that the corresponding duties will come into existence when a person becomes a migrant. The same can be said about the rights of prisoners. That these rights are attached to the status of someone as an imprisoned person does not mean that they are not universal human rights. What makes them universal human rights is that if and as soon as any person is found in this positionbecomes a worker, a migrant, or is imprisoned -that person will be entitled to be treated with the respect that universal human rights require.
At this point, it should be said that not all conditions in the specification of duties that correspond to human rights are acceptable. Making the prohibition of torture conditional upon citizenship status, for instance, would be inappropriate. Certain constraints on conditions may be appropriate then. 71 The status of someone as a worker, though, cannot be regarded as an inappropriate condition for the classification of labour rights as human rights, because it is 'not unduly remote for all human beings given the sociohistorical conditions to which the existence of the right has been indexed'. 72 To conclude this section, it can be said that every human being's relevant rights should be protected, as soon as she has a particular status. Every human being's labour rights should be protected, as soon as she becomes a worker. It is in that sense that labour rights can be seen as universal human rights. 69 Tasioulas, above n 62, p 37. 
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Labour Rights as Stringent Claims
The third characteristic that is supposed to differentiate labour rights from human rights -the non-strictness of labour rights -can also be questioned. The argument is that the content of labour rights, such as a right to minimum pay, varies from one country to the other, and is therefore dependent on what each society can afford. It is not a stringent entitlement of an absolute minimum that all countries ought to respect. It should be noted that if this argument is correct, it would mean that other social rights, like a right to basic subsistence or housing, are not human rights for the very same reason, namely because their precise content may vary depending on a country's resources.
Yet human rights are normative standards on the analysis of this section. The fact that a particular society at a given point in time is incapable of complying with a right, such as the right to housing, because of resource-constraints, does not imply that the right is not stringent. There is a stringent normative standard towards which this society ought to strive.
In law, the way in which compliance with duties that involve resources should be assessed, has been illustrated by the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights, which provides authoritative interpretations of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee explained that while the fulfilment of social rights depends on the availability of resources, some of the corresponding duties, such as the prohibition of discrimination, are immediately effective. This is true with certain labour rights too, such as the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace: certain of the obligations that they impose are immediate.
Moreover, the steps towards the 'progressive realisation' of social rights, when there are resource implications, ought to be taken immediately, and be 'deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant'. Legislation might be essential in order to fulfil the relevant obligations; yet the state should also take all other appropriate measures. Finally, there is always a minimum core of social rights that the authorities ought to protect, which is described as follows in General Comment No. 3:
10.
[…] a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every In assessing whether the state complies with its minimum core obligations, the Committee pays attention to resource constraints, but in order for a country to blame scarce resources for its failure to comply with the minimum core, it has to show that it has made very serious effort to address its minimum core duties. 73 The fact that certain labour rights may require resources and may, for this reason, face challenges in implementation when resources are scarce, is not a characteristic that necessarily distinguishes them from other human rights.
It should be added that resource constraints may also affect the application of rights that are universal on the classification that Collins puts forward. 
Labour Rights as Timeless Entitlements
The fourth and final objection that is used to support the claim that labour rights are not human rights is the variability over time. The argument is that 'labour rights may evolve according to the system of production, the forms of work, and the division of labour', 77 while other human rights are timeless. It should be said at this point that timelessness has been rejected in some scholarship looking at the normative core of human rights. 78 If we accept that it is a key feature, though, following the literature discussed in this section, we can question whether this characteristic is apposite to labour rights. To take another human right as an example, the fact that technological advancements may make the protection from invasions of privacy more complex than in the past does not mean that the right to the protection of a person's privacy is not a timeless claim. The claim is timeless but its particular expression changes depending on external factors. Similarly, labour rights such as the right to decent working conditions and the prohibition of slavery present abstract claims, which do not vary overtime: 'slavery is prohibited', for instance. Some of their more specific requirements, though, will depend on the system of production and will vary over time. Some of these more specific rights might be classified not as human rights but as a separate category, that of 'labour standards', which will be discussed later on. Importantly, though, certain labour rights are human rights, which are viewed as abstract normative standards, and these claims are timeless.
In fact, it can be said that the character of human rights as abstract standards makes them particularly appropriate for providing the fundamentals of the employment relation. This is because labour rights that attain the status of human rights do not have to be revised when the system of production changes. They entail abstract principles that are always applicable, irrespective of the historic circumstances. It is this abstract 77 Collins, above n 58, pp 142-143. 78 See Tasioulas, above n 62, p 35.
normative standard that is timeless, and against which the actual working conditions in different periods of time should be assessed.
Theoretical literature that questions the nature of labour rights as human rights seems to have overstated the differences between the two groups of claims. The answer to the question whether labour rights are human rights is probably more complex and subtle.
A case study
What emerges from the above is that certain labour rights are not necessarily and by definition different in nature to other human rights. It can, therefore, be said that some labour rights are human rights on the normative analysis, while there are others that involve the detailed regulation of the employment relation, and these can be called The methodology of the ILO in the Domestic Workers' Convention that ties a human rights approach in the regulation of domestic labour to concrete principles that target the problems of a specific sector exemplifies how labour rights as human rights can be intertwined with labour standards in law. The human rights approach recognises the universality, and the moral weight and urgency of domestic workers' claims. The labour standards (or sectoral) approach offers a focus on the particular challenges that workers in a specific sector face, making the general human rights principles more subtle and precise.
Implications
The position that certain labour rights are human rights seems to be the one that has primacy, and also has implications for the future development of the law and activists' Fourth, the endorsement of the view that certain labour rights are human rights can have implications when considering the question of the waiver of rights, which is critical in labour law. 86 A key concern for this field of study is the inequality of bargaining power between the employer and the worker. 87 As a result of this inequality of power, the employment contract is most of the times subject to little negotiation. It is drafted by the employer, and given to the worker on a 'take it or leave it' basis. 88 This contract may contain terms that are unfair, to which the worker would not have agreed had it not been for the power imbalance and the economic dependency. For example, it may include provisions that exclude important rights involving working conditions, such as the right to privacy in the workplace. By recognising that certain labour rights are human rights, agreement to waive them must be closely scrutinised.
Conclusion
This article examined three approaches to the question whether labour rights are human rights, which are usually not distinguished in literature. The underlying belief is that even though all three approaches can be valuable, it is important to realise that they are separate. The positivistic approach identifies the key legal documents and rights as protected therein, but does not have the tools to address discrepancies and problems in interpretation. The instrumental approach -no doubt a very important one -examines the strategies that those that are committed to workers' interests can use with success, as well as the possible drawbacks in pursuing each of these strategies. A possible shortcoming of it is that its proponents are sometimes disappointed when courts or other governmental or non-governmental organisations fail in the protection of labour rights as human rights, and this leads them to a rejection of human rights as fundamental 85 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 17 September principles altogether. Importantly, though, failures in the practical achievements of judicial bodies, as well as the human and labour rights movements, are not determinative. This is because human rights are, primarily and above all, normative standards, and certain labour rights, as it was argued in the third section, are human rights. Certain labour rights are compelling, stringent, universal and timeless entitlements, as much as rights such as the prohibition of torture or the right to privacy. If the law falls short of their protection, the response should be that the law ought to change. The recognition that certain labour rights are human rights, to conclude, does not imply that human rights exhaust labour law as a field of study. What it implies is that some labour rights are stringent normative entitlements, and this should be reflected in law.
